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Homeland Operations Concept

Foreword. This concept describes the Homeland Operations environment, constraints and limitations for these operations, a construct involving geographical and spatial considerations, and the participation of unit of purpose organizations. It explains The Army's role when the military is in the lead or in support of these operations. It also outlines force and operational design parameters and identifies needed Force Operating Capabilities (FOCs). While new policy, terms, definitions, and organizations are emerging, the common theme of our Nation's leadership is the priority to secure our homeland. This concept describes how The Army, leveraging its warfighting and other core competencies, will support that priority by proactively securing the homeland in the prevention of and protection against attacks. The Army will also be ready to support the mitigation of the effects of these attacks, when necessary. The concept also addresses The Army's continuing major role in support of civil authorities during times of crisis and natural or accidental disasters, which forms a base of experience, competence, and development for improvement of that effort. Finally the concept describes implications for doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).

Applicability. This pamphlet applies to Department of the Army Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) soldiers, civilians, and contractors involved in Homeland Operations.

Suggested Improvements. The Executive Agent for this concept is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine. Send Comments and suggested improvements on DA 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) through channels to the Commanding General, Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command, Homeland Security Directorate, ATTN: ATDO-H, Fort Monroe, VA 23651.

Availability. This publication is also available for authorized users on the Homeland Security Homepage at <http://doctrine.army.mil/hls/index.htm>.

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Homeland Operations Concept

Chapter 1

Introduction

1-1. Purpose. This pamphlet provides a concept for how The Army conducts Homeland Operations. The concept outlines The Army's roles and establishes a basis for the development of DOTMLPFs. It addresses homeland operations from a joint, unified, Army, interagency, and multi-jurisdictional perspective.

1-2. References. Required and related publications are listed in Appendix A.

1-3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms. Explanations of abbreviations and terms are listed in Appendix A Sections 1 and 2. At the time of this writing, Homeland Security (HLS) is generally accepted as the term that describes the prevention and mitigation of disasters in the homeland. However, the exact definition of HLS is still fluid and tends to fall across the spectrum from combating terrorism to "all-hazards." Since the HLS definition and taxonomy are still emerging, this concept will use the generic term Homeland Operations in order to avoid possible confusion associated with the term HLS and to consider the full breadth and scope of The Army's roles in the homeland. The intention is not to promulgate a new term, but rather to focus on the requirements and capabilities of The Army in "securing the nation." The Homeland Operations framework in this concept is compatible with thoughts on HLS at the national level so that when terms and definitions are finally approved, the concept will require minimal modification.

Chapter 2

General

2-1. Why the concept is needed.

a. The United States of America is leading an international war to defeat global terrorism. And the attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) have prompted our national leaders to set new priorities in this effort. Winning this war, while defending the homeland, is now a top priority for our nation's military, to include its Army. The Army has not been directed to take such an active role in securing the homeland since World War II. During the post-war era, civil support activities remained an Army function. However, The Army placed a high priority on other important roles and functions, mainly warfighting, and optimized its structure, doctrine, and training to that end. Since 9/11, the Armed Forces have a priority

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mission to prevent, protect against, and respond to threats and disasters in the homeland. These include attacks by terrorists. The Armed Forces, especially The Army, must also continue to support civil authorities for a myriad of other significant dangers and hazards.

b. The concept of Homeland Operations includes traditional and pre-9/11 requirements such as the Stafford Act, Department of Defense Directives (DODD), the Federal Response Plan (FRP), governmental and combatant command plans, joint and Army doctrine. These combine with new and emerging challenges such as those found in the *National Strategy for Homeland Security, Defense Planning Guidance, Quadrennial Defense Review, and Army Strategic Campaign Plan* to set new requirements for Homeland Operations. The Army will conduct Homeland Operations within Constitutional parameters, which will assure maintenance of our free and democratic society. At the same time, the forces and capabilities provided by The Army today and in the future must be available for worldwide use in other missions. Therefore, The Army's role includes the conduct of Homeland Operations, provision of mandated Title 10, United States Code (USC), support to combatant commanders as they execute their assigned missions, preparation and support of Army National Guard forces for state (Title 32, USC) and federal service, and preparation of forces for other assignments. The Army must also transform for its future Homeland Operations roles in accordance with the vision of its senior leadership.

c. An analysis of studies and professional articles, to include lessons learned from wargames, seminars, and actual operations drove the need for certain aspects of this concept. Historical perspective also weighed heavily on development of the framework and construct of this concept.

(1) In 1940, for example, the War Department began to analyze possible enemy attack scenarios and found that defense plans lacked depth. As a result, it developed the "Rainbow" plans, which changed the defense concept from a continental approach where the enemy was met at the ocean's edge to a hemispheric approach that would engage and defeat an enemy outside the Nation's immediate borders. To support this expanded defensive strategy; boundaries in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans set, in contemporary vernacular, an anti-access defense line. Our concept derives its geographic approach and construct from that of the 1940s defense strategy of two defensive areas (described more fully in Chapter 3).

(2) Both prior to and since 9/11, the Army has participated in and conducted exercises and wargames, which explored its role in Homeland Operations, both now and in the future. The 2002 Army Transformation Wargame for example, integrated homeland scenarios into the overall global conflict. An insight from that game was that a clever adversary would probably try to prevent the US from responding overseas by attacking its force projection platforms within the US. Another insight was the competition for combat service and combat service support assets between Homeland Operations and the overseas activities. One conclusion was that that forces supporting Homeland Operations may need to

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rely more on commercial assets.

(3) Lessons learned from Operation NOBLE EAGLE reveal that intelligence and information fusion is a significant seam in our military's ability to provide responsive support to the homeland. In the future, interagency, state, and local and military entities must continue to develop processes and procedures, especially the sharing of classified information, within legal guidelines, to enhance their ability to maintain situational understanding. Together, they must also strengthen processes for coordination and communication, from the establishment of liaison officers to the development and procurement of interoperable systems and sensors. Additional lessons learned from this operation and others include:

- 1 The importance of planning and coordination of training for use of force, working in the milieu of civilian publics, and sustainment of combat skills, such as marksmanship. The importance of training in the management of operations centers.
- 1 The importance of military bearing, appearance, and conduct when operating among US publics.
- 1 The criticality of continuous mission analysis, legal review, and use of the military decision making process.
- 1 Avoidance of changes to missions based on inadequate or false assumptions, misinterpreted intent, unrealistic development of implied tasks, or zeal in accommodating supported entities. This is sometimes called "mission creep." The goal should be deliberate, approved, appropriate, and validated mission changes in an environment of emergent activities, situations, and organizational participation.
- 1 The need for flexibility in determining military command and control (C2) arrangements to suit the situation and "battlespace" of the operation. The need for streamlined C2 to enable coordination.
- 1 The need for political leadership and decision-making based on sound advice from subject matter experts. The process needs to produce appropriate and prioritized support in as timely a manner as possible.
- 1 The need for good information management in terms of sources, conduits, and analysis. The importance of relevant information
- 1 The importance of transitions, to include measures of effectiveness, in shifting from managing a crisis to managing consequences, for example, and in eventual return to civilian only operations.
- 1 The importance of anticipation of problems and solutions.
- 1 The need for common definitions of key terms, such as "coordination," between operational players in a fluid environment of emerging requirements.
- 1 Translation of conflict management and assistance techniques from peace and humanitarian assistance operations to Homeland Operations.
- 1 The need and value of virtual reach for knowledge and expertise.
- 1 The requirement for development of joint doctrine and tactics,

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techniques and procedures for the use of Air Force and Army Air and Missile Defense units to protect high-profile civilian events, like the Winter Olympics and critical assets in the Nation's capitol from terrorist attacks.

(4) The study of history and lessons learned from recent exercises reveal many enduring principles for Homeland Operations. These are a few that influenced specific needs addressed by this concept.

- 1 The global security paradox. The Army must think globally in order to effectively conduct operations at home. This is an aspect of the principles of war of the Offensive and Maneuver.

- 1 The prevalence of support operations. The majority of operations in the homeland will be in support of civil authorities and our preparation must correlate with that purpose. This is an aspect of the principle of war of the Objective, relates to the principle of war of Mass and will involve unity of effort as discussed in the principle of war of Unity of Command.

- 1 The importance of space. Despite the prevalence of support to civil authorities, especially for the RC, Army air and missile defense efforts will be critical to the defense of the homeland. This is an aspect of the principle of war of Security.

- 1 The impacts and urgency of threats, attacks, significant disasters, and catastrophes in the homeland. These types of events may exceed the capability of civil authorities to respond. The Army must be able to provide surge capability in such circumstances. This is an aspect of the principle of war of the Objective, and relates to the principles of Mass, Security, Maneuver, and the Offensive.

- 1 The synergism of support, defense of the homeland, and warfighting capabilities. The Army's responsiveness, C2 capabilities, organization, and resources needed to fight wars make it capable of executing a wide range of Homeland Operations, including defense against air, cyber, and missile threats. Warfighting and Homeland Operation enhancements should be synergistic. This is an aspect of the principle of war of Economy of Force.

d. A secure homeland is a national priority. It is fundamental to the successful execution of the *National Security Strategy*, which together with the new *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, takes precedence over all other national strategies, programs, and plans. It is also essential to America's *National Military Strategy* and the Nation's ability to project power and to honor its global security commitments. When directed, the Armed Forces of the United States will be able to prevent and protect against threats at their source overseas or within

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the homeland. They will also respond to help mitigate the consequences of natural or accidental disasters or attacks against the homeland in the earliest stages. The Armed Forces are an essential element of an integrated national security posture.

e. Just as the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* seeks to leverage the Nation's unique strengths in the areas of law, science and technology, information sharing and systems, and international cooperation, The Army must examine and develop its capabilities in these areas. It must, for example, participate in reviewing statutes and regulations relating to quarantine and Posse Comitatus. It must ensure its capability to support, and if necessary, provide C2 of a joint force when conducting Homeland Operations. It must improve its information superiority, intelligence, and seamless C2 with other federal, state and local entities. It must design, in partnership with industry and the research and development community, better life support systems for its soldiers. It must continue to participate in international programs that facilitate overseas force projection and non-proliferation activities.

f. This concept:

(1) Discusses how The Army plans to support Homeland Operations in a joint, interagency and multi-jurisdictional framework.

(2) Provides direction for the development of DOTMLPFs.

(3) Informs The Army, other members of the joint community, other agencies, multinational partners, the defense industry, and research and development and academic communities about The Army's approach to Homeland Operations and its needs.

(4) Assists The Army in defining the requirements to support Homeland Operations by describing required capabilities.

2-2 Homeland Operations Environment.

a. Homeland Operations primarily take place in all land, air, and sea territories of the US and includes space operations. This area encompasses the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and the Caribbean and western Pacific possessions and territories. As such, the Areas of Responsibility of multiple combatant commands are involved within this geographical area. Additionally, federal, state, and local government agencies constitute a robust and diverse interagency milieu, which has distinct legal and functional jurisdictions. The US Army operates as a partner in this interagency and multi-jurisdictional environment.

b. The US Army, with its Secretary as the Department of Defense (DOD) executive agent for military support to civil authorities, must be prepared to defend and support the US population and territory and the American way of life. This is also its Constitutional requirement and history. The homeland has not always been secure, and military support was necessary to protect civilians. In

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Pennsylvania in 1794, for example, President Washington employed the militia, the volunteer force that later became the National Guard, in a show of force to suppress the insurrection known as the Whiskey Rebellion. During the War of 1812, The Army defended the nation against invasion. In 1916 it secured the southern border against bandit raids. In 1919 it supported quarantine operations in response to the Flu pandemic in the US. During the Second World War it defeated the enemy occupying U.S. territory in the Aleutian Islands. As recently as the early 1990s, all three components of The Army deployed to Los Angeles to protect the population from rioters.

c. These actions are part of Army full spectrum operations. Support of civil authorities is a core Army competency listed in FM 1, *The Army*. The Army also conducts these operations under civilian control, in most cases a lead federal agency (LFA). This is in accordance with the fundamental tenet of its professional ethos--subordination to civilian authority. Also, The Army will generally conduct Homeland Operations only when tasked after civilian authorities request such support from DOD. This may be in response to natural or man-made disasters.

d. Under extraordinary circumstances and when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, The Army may conduct combat operations within the homeland to prevent, deter, preempt, and defeat an adversary's threat or attack. The Army can be proactive in its warfighting operations – when the military has the lead. However, the vast majority of Homeland Operations for The Army, with its unique “all-hazards” capabilities, will be civil agency support and augmentation. The Army has significant or unique resources that may support response to a major disaster or emergency, to include threats or use of weapons of mass effects (WME), chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) attacks, or the effects of flooding, hurricanes, earthquakes, industrial accidents and the like. The Army provides response resources when needed, but this support will normally be temporary until a civil entity can function without help.

e. Federal civilian agencies are generally the primary agents for the coordination and employment of US government support. With the exception of protecting the nation from missile, air, naval, and ground assault, and the protection of military facilities and installations, the military will play a supporting role. DOD will be guided by civilian law and led by the principle that the federal government assists state agencies, except in terrorism and other incidents where the federal government has primary jurisdiction. The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 USC 1385, restricts the circumstances under which military personnel may be used for civilian law-enforcement activities. When supporting state and local authorities, DOD usually does so through other federal agencies according to established agreements and plans and will not compete with the civilian or commercial sector. Its support will be coherent with all the capabilities of the joint community during joint operations, and interagency cooperation will be critical to success.

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f. Homeland Operations may modify some warfighting processes and expectations. Intelligence is an example. The conduct of operations in a major combat operation (MCO), smaller-scale contingencies (SSC), or peacetime military engagement (PME) foreign-based contingency will be different from similar operations conducted in the homeland. In a foreign-based contingency, The Army receives detailed intelligence from national and theater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. In Homeland Operations, The Army may receive some indications and warnings of a hostile threat or act from the national or theater level. However, events and actions will transpire quickly at the local level. Thus, The Army must also rely on local entities for detailed situational understanding. Within legal boundaries, it must integrate a coordinated ISR collection architecture and national intelligence agency analysis effort with all appropriate civil and law enforcement agencies. The Army has also relied on AC forces for deployment and early employment in overseas conflicts, with RC forces, including The Army National Guard (ARNG), providing follow-on forces. Within the homeland, these roles may reverse as state authorities call on local guardsmen for initial support with the AC providing follow-on forces. The latter could be in support or under the operational control of the RC force commander.

2-3. Threats, Hazards, and Characteristics of the Environment.

a. Operational Context. It is possible that The Army may have to contend with every possible natural or man-made catastrophe, disaster, or dilemma known to humanity as it conducts Homeland Operations. Conventional attacks on the homeland are also a possibility and, as a minimum, The Army must remain prepared to continue to perform its conventional warfighting roles and functions within this environment. Moreover, our adversaries are watching, learning, and adapting. They will seek to marginalize the strength of our strategies and wait us out. In so doing they can accept not losing as an end state. They are modernizing. They will change from conventional operations when threatened and pursue an asymmetric strategy. They can also counter our capabilities with sufficient mass and technology to inflict highly visible and embarrassing losses. They will seek to defy our world leadership and economic viability. The presence and involvement of numerous agencies from all jurisdictions and the nongovernmental sector will challenge C2 and coordination.

b. Terrorism. Not the least of the threats to be faced are attacks against the Nation, to include the use of terrorism. The Force Protection Operational and Organizational (O&O) Plan describes and explains in detail the background, organization, structures, activities, processes and modus operandi of today's terrorists. Especially ominous are cooperative endeavors between adversaries who employ terrorism, insurgency, and crime to pursue their objectives. This will complicate efforts to defeat them singularly and in detail. The dedication of fearless fanatics further complicates these threats, as does the possibility of state-sponsorship, availability of CBRNE or WME (including the proliferation of tactical ballistic missiles and cruise missiles), and sanctuary in stateless,

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underdeveloped regions of the world. *The National Strategy for Homeland Security* also describes several important characteristics of terrorism. Among These are the following:

(1) Terrorists will pick targets based on their symbolic value and weaknesses they find in our defenses and preparations. These perceived weaknesses include our open and democratic society, which allows freedom of movement and association, and our free market system, which can be exploited for financial support or attacked for its strength and vigor. Our open, welcoming, pluralistic, diverse society and the value we place on individual lives, also presents vulnerabilities. Our worldwide engagement opens us to attack beyond our shores. Finally, the security from external threat, which we have enjoyed in the past by virtue of two vast oceans, must now be bolstered by some greater measure of internal "distance."

(2) Terrorists may use a wide array of possible ways and means to attack the US, from CBRNE or WME, including offensive information operations and cyber attack, to conventional means, or as we have learned recently, by using our own assets against us.

(3) Given the importance of centers of gravity to military operations in the past and indeed, in recently conceived operating concepts, the challenge to the US military will be to identify such centers. Absent doing so, it may need to develop entirely new ways to confront terrorism, ways perhaps not yet envisioned. Terrorist use of small nodes and cells rather than hubs and spokes could complicate our efforts.

(4) As part of an asymmetric approach to war, surprise is key to terrorist actions. We frequently do not know the identity and location of non-state terrorist organizations or terrorist intent. The ability of terrorists to infiltrate and move freely hampers detection and promotes surprise.

(5) Opportunistic terrorists exploit vulnerabilities, choosing the time, place, and method of attack.

c. Other "hazards" and conditions. Natural disasters such as tornadoes and tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, drought, wildfires, and human and animal epidemics, as well as man-made or man-related disasters such as transportation and industrial accidents, may call for Army support within the homeland. Similarly, existing laws permit postal augmentation, certain types of support to law enforcement not involving terrorists, and military assistance to civil disturbances.

d. Characteristics. Each of the threats, "hazards," and conditions may have some or all of the following characteristics:

(1) Concentration of unfamiliar effects such as CBRNE or WME leading to bewilderment.

(2) Misinformation and disinformation.

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(3) Panic, fear, and possible chaos, although research indicates that these would occur only in limited circumstances.

(4) Tenuous public security and lack of law and order.

(5) Significant, or in some cases, even catastrophic environmental and infrastructure damage to include:

- 1 Vital human services--hospitals, water supplies, waste and hazardous material storage and processing, emergency services (police, fire, medical, rescue).

- 1 Civil administration---legislative, judicial, and administrative functions.

- 1 Communications and information--television, radio, telephone, Internet, newspapers, magazines, and computer systems.

- 1 Transportation and distribution--highways, railways, ports, waterways, pipelines, airports, and mass transit..

- 1 Energy--production, storage, and distribution of electric power, including nuclear facilities, oil, and natural gas.

- 1 Food--agricultural production, processing, and storage.

- 1 Commerce--key industries and companies, banking, and finance.

- 1 Industrial--chemical production facilities.

(6) Threats of disease or epidemic as a secondary effect.

(7) Presence of displaced, homeless, and disoriented populace, possibly riotous or undisciplined, in some limited circumstances.

(8) Stress disorders, depression, disillusionment, and other psychological trauma among the victim population or assisting organizations.

e. Implications. The environment suggests a wider spectrum of operations, increased unpredictability, and a more complex range of operating conditions. It dictates new ways to think and operate and presents a force design and training dilemma across the full spectrum of conflict. The Army must be capable of preventing, protecting against, or effectively responding to attacks by conventional and unconventional forces, terrorists, criminal organizations and other threats. It must also be capable of dealing with "all hazards." Army leaders will require an unparalleled degree of situational understanding and planning for a wide range of tasks. It must be ready, for example, to use its high-density organizations for such manpower intensive tasks as infrastructure protection. It must also be ready to use low-density organizations, such as medical or behavioral health teams that deal with stress, for events that create unusual effects. It must also be able to generate additional resources for all these functions.

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2-4. Capstone Concept. This concept supports The Army's overarching concept described in United States Army White Paper, Concepts for the Objective Force and in Draft TRADOC Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-0, The United States Army Objective Force Operational and Organizational Concept, The Army Vision, and Joint Vision 2020.

2-5. Joint Concepts. This concept will be consistent with and supportive of the following joint concepts:

- 1 Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO).
- 1 Operational Net Assessment (ONA).
- 1 Joint Interactive Planning (JIP).
- 1 Collaborative Information Environment (CIE).
- 1 Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP).
- 1 Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ).
- 1 Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) .

2-6. Other Concepts. This concept will be consistent with and supportive of the following Army concepts:

- 1 Draft TP 525-66, Force Operating Capabilities.
- 1 TP 525-3-90, Objective Force Unit of Action.
- 1 Draft TP 525-3-100, Objective Force Unit of Employment.
- 1 TP 525-60, Operational Concept for Space Support to Land Force Operations.
- 1 TP 525-73, Concept for Nonlethal Capabilities in Army Operations.
- 1 TP 525-91, Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Integrating Concept.
- 1 Draft TP 525-3-14, Army Space Operations.
- 1 TP 525-82, Army National Missile Defense.
- 1 Force Protection O&O.
- 1 Draft TP 525-3XX, Concept for Army Special Operations Forces.

2-7. Constraints and Limitations.

a. The operational construct is designed for the security of the homeland. Certain aspects of this concept may not apply to global operations given the unique operational environment within the US , its territories, and possessions.

b. The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 USC 1385, service regulations, and policies prohibit the use of federal military forces from performing civil law enforcement functions unless permitted by an Act of Congress or the Constitution. The Smith Mundt Act of 1947 prohibits psychological operations against US citizens. Army Regulation (AR) 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities, circumscribes certain intelligence activities in the civil sector.

c. Civil Support Operations: All requests from civil authorities for support are evaluated by DOD approval authorities against the following criteria:

- 1 Legality (compliance with laws).

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- 1 Lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces).
- 1 Risk (safety of DOD forces).
- 1 Cost (who pays, impact on DOD budget)
- 1 Appropriateness (whether the requested mission is proper and fitting for military participation).
- 1 Readiness (impact on ability to perform other missions).
- 1 Current laws and/or policies governing DOD intelligence collection and sharing of interagency information.
- 1 Current statutes governing DOD domestic offensive information operations.

d. With the exception of support to counterdrug operations, the standing rules of engagement for US forces, as delineated by Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01 A, do not apply in civil support operations. The DOD Civil Disturbance Plan, also known as Garden Plot, contains guidelines for forces in civil disturbance situations. Forces deployed to support civil authorities for disaster situations follow use-of-force guidelines as set forth in the mission's execute and subsequent orders.

Chapter 3

Concept

3-1 General Summary. The Army will remain capable today and become more capable in the future of playing a key role in the DOD's ability to prevent an adversary from attacking the homeland, protect against attacks on the homeland, and respond in support of civil authorities. It will do so when DOD is either lead or support within two geographic zones; the land, air, and sea of the Homeland Zone and the land, air, sea, and space of the Forward Zone, which encompasses those geographic and spatial entities outside the Homeland Zone.

3-2. Concept.

a. **Framework.** Homeland Operations consist of those legally sanctioned military measures to prevent, protect, and respond to all-hazards threats against the US, its territories and possessions, that endanger its people, resources, facilities, and critical infrastructure. The Army will participate in the following ways:

- 1 **Prevent** an adversary from attacking the homeland. Prevention is a primary goal of in Homeland Operations. Prevention includes the ability to deter, preclude, or preempt adversaries in a proactive manner. The Army's contribution to the joint force capability to rapidly and decisively defeat an adversary may deter outright aggression. If deterrence fails, Army forces in a joint force may rapidly deploy to gain a positional advantage that causes an adversary to “re-

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think” their original intentions or preclude them from continuing with their mission. Finally, Army forces in a joint force may move preemptively to destroy enemy threats before they are able to attack the homeland. Preemption may also include offensive information operations or actions to mitigate or prevent disasters such as engineer dams or levees.

1 **Protect** against attacks on the homeland. The US will endeavor to prevent all threats to the Homeland. However, o it must be prepared to defend against expected and surprise attacks, both physical and cyber. Protection includes measures to detect, interdict, and defeat threats, preferably before they reach the homeland. Air and missile defense, defense of US sovereignty, and critical infrastructure and key asset protection are aspects of protection.

1 **Respond** to support civil authorities. Upon request, DOD Army responds to support civil authorities in natural, man-made, non-hostile, and hostile disasters, in many cases primarily with Army forces. These disasters may emanate from natural causes such as hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes or man-made causes such as civil disorder, industrial accidents, and mass immigration. Hostile disasters may include CBRNE or WME. In all cases, The Army may provide support to save lives, prevent property damage, and reduce suffering until civil authorities are able to restore control. Such operations place a premium on Army surge capabilities in order to mitigate effects and may involve immediate response under certain circumstances. Preparedness will be key enabler of response.

These operations involve coordination and synchronization of active and passive measures between federal (to include DOD), state, and local governments and agencies to protect the US. Homeland Operations bring together traditional and emerging national security requirements, with an emphasis on a proactive approach to threats and hazards. These operations may be globally focused, but only as they pertain to direct threats against the homeland. The majority of operations are conducted in the homeland. Nevertheless, Army forces must be prepared to respond rapidly and decisively beyond the borders of the homeland as part, or even as an Army force (ARFOR) headquarters, functional land component, or joint task force (JTF) headquarters of a joint force.

When directed, The Army will participate to preempt adversaries that directly threaten our homeland before they have an opportunity to attack us, as we look globally to defeat hostile actors at their source. Army forces must be capable of defeating adversaries within the homeland and of providing support to civilian authorities in a variety of ways, even while defeating adversaries outside our borders. A transformed Army will have enhanced capabilities to conduct these operations more quickly, efficiently, and with reduced casualties and collateral damage.

b. **Roles.** The Army conducts Homeland Operations as part of a DOD effort that will be in a lead or support role. In a lead role, DOD would have primary

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responsibility for an operation. In a support role it would aid, protect or support another agency. DOD may also perform both roles simultaneously.

(1) Lead. Under extraordinary circumstances, the military may be directed to defend, and if necessary, engage to defeat the efforts of an adversary within the homeland. The Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense System (GBMCDS), formerly called National Missile Defense, is an example of an Army system used in this role. Other DOD lead roles include the defense of the Nation's airspace and maritime approaches and some intelligence operations.

(2) Support. DOD provides support to federal, state, and local agencies in circumstances that are or could be catastrophic in nature, such as mitigating the effects of an attack or disaster. This category also includes support missions that are routine and limited in scope, such as support to National Security Special Events (NSSE).

c. Operational Concept and Zones.

(1) General. Military planners in 1940 developed their hemispheric strategy to provide both depth and an anti-access component to defense of the homeland, as well as to facilitate offensive operations. Today the US military must be able to prevent, protect, and respond to threats and hazards in two spatial and geographic zones: the land, air, and sea of the Homeland Zone, and the land, air, sea, and space of the Forward Zone. These zones may overlap or change depending on the situation. The Homeland and Forward Zones include some aspects of the global information environment with their own



characteristics, and the US will conduct fluid operations in the associated cyberspace. Conceptually the zones display an area in which the military and other agencies conduct integrated operations to prevent, protect, and respond to threats and hazards to ensure a secure homeland. This operational concept is proactive, appropriately focused for internal and external threats, and conducted in depth by layering military and interagency capabilities, beginning at the source of the threat. The availability of resources from other federal, state, and local agencies at and within the Nation's borders, highlights the importance of interagency interoperability. In each zone The Army must also be capable of rapidly deploying to conduct coherent joint operations, when required, while leveraging focused logistics, trained and ready soldiers and units, and current and future sustainability and survivability. As required, The Army will participate

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in the national effort to control and defend land, people, infrastructure, and natural resources in each zone.

(2) Homeland Zone. The Homeland Zone consists of all states, territories, and possessions, and surrounding water generally out to 500 nautical miles. The Homeland Zone is the inner ring within which a comprehensive land, maritime, and aerospace strategy protects the homeland. In conflict, The Army, normally as part of a joint force, may be called upon to defeat an adversary in this zone while simultaneously conducting operations to defeat the source of the threat in the Forward Zone, including space.

(a) The risks in this zone include terror cells; enemy special operations forces; WME and CBRNE attack; strategies that degrade our installations or ground, air, and sea means of transportation and infrastructure; natural and technological disasters; challenges to public confidence; criminal activity; or missiles.

(b) The Army's roles in response to crises in the Homeland Zone may include: joint and interagency operations, defensive operations, support to law enforcement, disaster relief, civil disturbance, counterdrug operations, force protection of deploying forces, infrastructure assurance, air defense, and other civil support. As charged in various plans, statutes, and directives, The Army will help defend the industrial base, provide engineering and transportation support, treat and evacuate casualties, manage the consequences of WME and CBRNE, and support and reinforce civil authorities. Army forces in this zone will include but are not limited to special purpose forces such as explosive ordnance (EOD) disposal, medical, or engineer units. These forces may have small support packages and reduced sustainment demands.

(c) While DOD is lead in this zone, The Army will use its warfighting skills and capabilities not found in the civil and private sectors. The best efforts of all levels of government may be unable to prevent hostile actions against the Nation. If required, The Army's strategic and operational role must be to defend the homeland against attacks and interdict or destroy all threats. This will normally be a joint operation in conjunction with civil authorities. However, attacks against the homeland by the military forces of a nation-state will be met by the Armed Forces of the United States in a lead role.

Homeland Zone

All US states, territories and possessions.

Task: Interdict and destroy threats against the homeland

Purpose: Protect citizens, environment, and infrastructure

(d) While DOD is in support in this zone, The Army will also strategically and operationally use its organic assets designed for the warfight and provide selected capabilities for use. These may be as support to a civil lead or a

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cooperative effort between military and civil leads. Certain statutes, directives, and plans also require support. The Army is capable of providing a wide scope of such support. For example, The Army provides support to the 12 emergency support functions contained in the FRP. The Army may be required to mitigate the effects of a hostile or non-hostile generated disaster, to save lives and reduce suffering, or to maintain and restore law and order. It may do so with state National Guard forces as the first military responders. Support may also be routine and limited in scope, such as counterdrug, NSSE and surge requirements for civil security requirements, such as at airports or at borders. The Army will routinely conduct support operations within an interagency and sometimes joint framework.

Homeland Zone

Task: Support CBRNE and WME Consequence Management

Purpose: Mitigate effects of a CBRNE or WME disaster

Task: Support Civil Law Enforcement

Purpose: Maintain or Restore Law & Order

Task: Conduct Relief Operations

Purpose: Save lives and reduce suffering

(3) Forward Zone. The Forward Zone consists of the remaining land, air, space and sea areas not included in the Homeland Zone. DOD precludes and defeats threats to the homeland in this zone. When actionable intelligence is received, the US may move to preempt by defeating the threat at the source.

(a) The risks in this zone include state sponsored and transnational terror, aggressor rogue nations, WME and CBRNE proliferation, misuse of maritime shipping or air avenues of approach to the homeland, illegal immigration, transnational criminal enterprise, ballistic, cruise missile and other aerial threats. They also include adversary offensive information operations (IO), including both cyber attack and manipulation of foreign and domestic publics (friendly, adversary and neutral) to disadvantage US interests and activities and anti-access strategies and tactics. The Army's roles in response to crises in this zone may include: deterrence, preemption, missile defense, interdiction, interception, ISR, support to counterdrug operations, counterproliferation, security of aerial and seaports of debarkation, integrated full-spectrum IO and other joint, interagency or multi-jurisdictional operations. Army forces in this zone will likely include operationally and tactically mobile maneuver units; Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF); networked, enhanced command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capable units; and air and missile defense units.

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(b) The Army's role in this zone I, under DOD's aegis, is to prevent threats to the homeland as far forward as possible. The Army can help reduce arms races, counter the proliferation of CBRNE or WME, combat terrorism, and deter aggression. The Army, as part of a joint force, can also conduct limited preemptive operations. These are designed to defeat imminent threats against the homeland, but are not categorized as SSCs or MCOs. They are not campaigns, but are quick and limited offensive strikes designed to interdict or destroy adversaries who attempt to take advantage of air, space, sea, and land approaches to infiltrate our territory. Successful operations in the Forward Zone will require The Army to be able to develop accurate and timely intelligence as part of a joint, interagency, and multinational team. Preemptive operations will require Army forces that have tactical maneuverability, precision munitions, and information superiority. During some preemptive operations, forward-deployed maneuver support units, including air and missile defense units, may be employed to support strike operations.

Forward Zone

All air, sea, land, and space areas of the world outside the Homeland Zone.

Task: Defeat imminent threats against the homeland through limited preemptive operations

Purpose: Prevent attacks against the homeland zone

The Army must be tied into national intelligence collection and analyses networks and provide ARSOF to rapidly counter threats. These protective actions may take place in a joint and multi national operation.

(4) Quality of Firsts. A new paradigm of how Army units will achieve mission success across the spectrum of military operations, based on leap-ahead capabilities enabled by advanced technologies, these describe how these units will see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively at the tactical level.

(a) In tactical Homeland Operations involving DOD as the lead, The Army will:

See / Understand First to:

- Develop the situation out of physical contact
- Identify threats
- Determine enemy intent
- Determine methods of operation/organization (order of battle)
- Identify networks and linkages (transnational terror)

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- 829 – Identify centers of gravity
- 830 Act First to:
- 831 – Achieve positional advantage
- 832 – Preclude adversaries ability to achieve their objectives
- 833 – Disrupt command, control, computers, and communications
- 834 – Reduce enemy freedom of action
- 835 • Fix, contain, isolate forces
- 836 • Deny sanctuary/force out of sanctuary
- 837 – Conduct multidimensional operations
- 838 • Maneuver fires / fires / non-kinetic / psychological
- 839 • Create broad range of options
- 840 • Increase complexity on enemy
- 841 • Force enemy to react / adapt to our operations
- 842 • Apprehend
- 843 Finish decisively by:
- 844 – Destroying, disorganizing, disintegrating adversaries
- 845 – Denying adversary objectives

846
847 (b) In tactical operations involving DOD in support, The Army will:

- 848
849 See / Understand First to:
- 850 – Assist preparedness
 - 851 – Develop the situation
 - 852 – Anticipate required support to the lead
 - 853 – Identify required support from the lead
 - 854 – Identify capabilities
 - 855 – Integrate with interagency and multi-jurisdictional partners
- 856 Act First to:
- 857 – Save lives, protect property, and reduce suffering
 - 858 – Mitigate the consequences of a disaster
 - 859 – Reassure the public
 - 860 – Reduce further damage/disorder
 - 861 – Restore/maintain critical infrastructure
 - 862 – Provide surge capability to civil agencies
 - 863 – Preclude adversaries ability to achieve objective
- 864 Finish decisively by:
- 865 – Restoring control to civil authorities
 - 866 -- Denying enemy objectives

867
868
869 c. **Characteristics of the Force.** To conduct Homeland Operations Army
870 forces must have the following characteristics:

871
872 (1) Responsiveness. Responsiveness has the quality of time, distance, and
873 sustained momentum. The Army must be able to respond to events and incidents
874 in as near to real-time as possible in order to use its competencies and resources

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875 to achieve the most positive impact on the situation. The Army maintains
876 responsiveness in Homeland Operations through effective and redundant C2,
877 mission tailored forces, interagency coordination and cooperation, function-
878 based organizations, and RC forces in local communities.

879 (2) Deployability. The Army must be able to deploy quickly within the
880 homeland. The exact timing of deployment has not been set and may differ by
881 type of unit to be deployed. In any case, timing should be such to significantly
882 help prevent, protect against, or reduce casualties and damage to property or
883 infrastructure. Such a qualitative level of deployability has not been required or
884 displayed in the past, since local and state authorities, as first responders, have
885 been able to accomplish much in the initial stages of an incident. However, the
886 threat of CBRNE and WME complicates present day circumstances and may
887 require simultaneous and coherent, near-real time deployments of the full scope
888 of national capabilities.

889 (3) Agility. At the operational level of war, agility describes the mental and
890 physical ability to transition rapidly from support to offensive and defensive or
891 stability operations and back again. Nowhere will this agility be needed more
892 than in Homeland Operations where requirements can vary so greatly. Agility is
893 tied to initiative and speed. The Army must develop agile leaders at all levels,
894 and in all components, who can conduct Homeland Operations decisively and
895 who can leverage the full range of Army competencies.

896 (4) Versatility. Versatility describes the inherent capacity of Army formations
897 to prevail at any point of the spectrum of Homeland Operations. These
898 formations will be capable of adapting to mission changes and roles (lead,
899 support) with minimal adjustment. Army units must be equipped and trained for
900 effectiveness in any of the roles they are asked to perform.

901 (5) Lethality. When engaged to defeat an adversary in a lead role, The
902 Army must have lethal combat power to include fires, maneuver, leadership,
903 protection, and information. Through technological improvements in weaponry
904 and munitions, The Army must have the capability to engage hostile forces with
905 smaller caliber weapons, greater precision, and less collateral damage. Key
906 enablers include organic line-of-sight, beyond line-of-sight, and non line-of-sight
907 fires. The Army must also have non-lethal weapons to decisively disable targets,
908 both mechanical and human, with little or no collateral effects.

909 (6) Survivability. The Army will take advantage of technologies that provide
910 maximum protection at the individual soldier level, whether that soldier is
911 mounted or dismounted. Such protection may include immunization. The agility
912 of our formations combined with the common operating procedures is critical to
913 maximize survivability. Ground and air platforms will leverage the best
914 combination of low observation, WME and CBRNE protection, and ISR. By
915 seizing the initiative and seeing, understanding, and acting first, Army forces will
916 enhance their survivability.

917 (7) Sustainability. The Army must aggressively reduce its logistics footprint
918 and replenishment requirements. It must deploy fewer vehicles and equipment

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and leverage reach capabilities. The Army must achieve maintenance efficiencies and commonality across joint formations in chassis, repair parts, fuel, and munitions. Through this process, The Army will revolutionize the manner in which it transports and sustains its force in the homeland. Contracted support and sustainment, is possible and desirable.

d. **Design Parameters.** The Army is optimized for warfighting and will generally not create force structure solely for Homeland Operations. However, Army units must be prepared to defend and support US citizens and territory as well as be available for worldwide use in other missions. Therefore, Army units must be capable of being tailored for Homeland Operations. Units may also rotate into higher states of readiness for Homeland Operations through more intensive training, alert status, use of commercial off the shelf (COTS) equipment, or equipment modification. This will require a unit design capable of providing support to multi-jurisdictional, federal, state, and local governments. This design must also afford availability of the unit for worldwide deployment to engage in full spectrum operations. To conduct Homeland Operations Army units should be designed with the following parameters:

(1) Capable of Being Tailored for Homeland Operation Support Roles. Response will often be to augment the capabilities of civil authorities as they respond to disasters. This may require support to law enforcement or managing the consequences of CBRNE/WME . Accordingly, The Army's support to civil authorities may require specialty assets found in combat support or combat service support units in greater proportion than those found in combat units. Unit design must include sufficient manpower and equipment to provide the needed support without degrading the unit's warfighting capability.

(2) Modular. Units must have a standardized structure with the ability to quickly task organize with multifunctional soldiers to provide the flexibility required in supporting Homeland Operations. This flexibility must exist at all levels of the organization. This enables rapid force tailoring prior to deployment as well as during employment. When needed, this modular design will facilitate operational integration with civilian components of Homeland Operations. This modular design will provide the versatility and agility needed for Homeland Operations.

(3) Function-Based. The Army will need forces capable of being tailored to facilitate function-based task organization. Using the principal of modular design, units can be rapidly organized for function-based tasks. Examples are: military assistance to civil disturbances, providing Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team type organizations to an incident involving CBRNE or WME, or providing engineer, water and transportation during a disaster.

(4) Wide Span of Control. Homeland Operations will often be characterized by support spanning a sizeable geographical area and involving many state, local, and federal agencies with distinct legal and functional jurisdictions. Responding units must have C2 capabilities that are interoperable with joint, interagency, and local or state entities. Units must also be able to build up or

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scale down through contingency mission tailoring. Units must also be designed to be able to become an ARFOR, functional land component, or JTF headquarters.

(5) Threshold Capabilities. Units must rapidly execute the full range of Homeland Operations with the right forces at the right time. The ability to prevent, protect against or respond to any level of threat or disaster, any time, any place, and under any circumstance or condition will be a keystone characteristic of future Army forces that support Homeland Operations. In order to keep pace with a rapidly changing situation, systems must be designed to accept capabilities that meet new thresholds.

(6) Civil Integration. A key characteristic of most Homeland Operations will be the military in support of a LFA, which is supporting a state or local government. Responding military forces must be trained in civil procedures and have the ability to operate within the civil C2 or incident command structure as it mitigates the consequences of an attack or disaster. Responding soldiers and commanders and their staffs must act decisively to save lives, protect property and reduce suffering as they provide the surge capability to struggling civil agencies. This must be done while almost always in a support rather than lead role during these operations.

(7) Tailored Support. Support to Homeland Operations must provide the effective force needed to rapidly and efficiently mitigate the effects of an attack or disaster. Responding with the right force in the most expeditious manner ensures the agility needed to transition to a support role.

(8) Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS). The use of COTS equipment and technology by military forces supporting Homeland Operations allows greater interoperability with other federal, state, and local agencies, improving effectiveness and efficiency of responding forces. This will reduce the logistics footprint and replenishment requirements of responding forces by allowing the use of contracted civil assets for support and sustainment.

e. **Required Capabilities.** The following capabilities must be available to The Army as it conducts Homeland Operations:

(1) Interagency Coordination, Integration, and Communication. The integration of military forces, often in support of another federal agency, must be as transparent to the supported state or local government as equipment, training, and resources will allow. This seamless integration includes the ability to synchronize with federal, local, and state entities. State National Guard may play a role in this integration. A collaborative information environment and joint interagency coordination groups tailored to Homeland Operations and linked to a National Incident Command System will be necessary. Selected personnel must be trained in the procedures and capabilities of civil agencies and relevant communications equipment and technology. Necessary COTS equipment must be planned for and readily available.

(2) Detection and Mitigation Support. Army forces must have the ability to task organize function based units that can immediately identify CBRNE agents

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1009 or substances, assess current and projected consequences, advise on response
1010 measures, and provide support validated by proper authorities. Such support
1011 may include mass decontamination. This support must be especially timely to
1012 help mitigate the loss of life property, and human suffering.

1013 (3) Intelligence and Information Fusion. Intelligence and information
1014 systems must be designed to provide nearly instantaneous intelligence and
1015 information from the strategic, operational, tactical and local levels. To respond to
1016 threat activities, this fusion capability must provide actionable information and
1017 intelligence, geospatial products, and all source assessments that enable
1018 decision-makers and leaders to adapt and focus the effort where and when
1019 needed. This fusion must involve the interface of Army and civil law enforcement
1020 intelligence operations in so far as legally acceptable. Within the legal
1021 framework, systems must be in place to allow the transfer of intelligence and
1022 information between civil and military authorities. In support of this fusion effort, a
1023 common set of all source analysis tools must be developed to support the
1024 intelligence assessment process at the national intelligence agency, combatant
1025 commands and state and local agencies. These tools must support instant cross
1026 cueing of both intelligence and law enforcement sensors, and operate in a multi-
1027 level security classification environment.

1028 (4) Engineering. Response to disasters frequently involves the requirement
1029 for the full range of engineer support, such as construction of emergency
1030 facilities, acquisition of real estate, geospatial engineering, emergency debris
1031 removal, and many other typical engineer activities. These activities will require
1032 engineer units and assets from the US Army Corps of Engineers. Responding
1033 units must have the capability to integrate organic and additional engineer assets
1034 into function based organizations supporting relief operations. Also, engineers
1035 may be required to operate under hazardous conditions (e.g., low level
1036 radioactive environment) requiring special training and modifications to
1037 equipment. In addition, because engineer units must synchronize with US Army
1038 Corps of Engineers, contractors and non-DOD engineers, their C2 systems must
1039 be interoperable with other systems.

1040 (5) Logistics Coordination, Distribution and Medical Support. Homeland
1041 Operations should have a minimal logistical footprint, while ensuring sufficient
1042 and efficient support. Contract logistical support, such as the Logistics Civil
1043 Augmentation Program will assure the agility of warfighting forces to respond to
1044 Homeland Operations and worldwide missions. Logistics may include the full
1045 range of such support but especially medical support for casualty treatment and
1046 evacuation (including stress management resources), pharmaceutical distribution
1047 and mass care support including water, shelter, food, and emergency first aid to
1048 disaster victims. Health risk assessment and tracking, medical surveillance, and
1049 a standardized system for augmentation of civilian medical capabilities will also
1050 be necessary. Logistics in Homeland Operations must be capable of supporting
1051 not only The Army but also federal, state and local responders and possibly joint
1052 forces in accordance with existing directives and agreements. Coordination of
1053 priorities will be critical.

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(6) Lethal and Non-Lethal Capabilities. Homeland Operations will require the ability to project scalable non-lethal capabilities. All units must be proficient in the application of force, whether it's lethal or non-lethal. The use of non-lethal capabilities provide commanders and leaders at all levels the ability to influence the potential actions of an enemy, civilians or other non-combatants when minimizing collateral damage or death is the preferred objective. Soldiers will require extensive training in the rules of the use of force and in the use of non-lethal systems in Homeland Operations. During civil disturbances, it is likely that non-lethal systems will be employed to protect responding soldiers and to use the minimum required force necessary to establish control and order. In civil support situations non-lethal capabilities must be available to engage threats and neutralize, mitigate, or defeat them.

(7) Civil Augmentation Resources. The Army must have rapidly deployable resources and trained soldiers to provide a temporary surge capability to civil authorities when they have exhausted their assets. Examples of this support include but are not limited to Border Patrol augmentation to counter illegal immigration, counterdrug operations in support of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and airport security in support of the Transportation Security Administration. Historically, when civil assets were unable to meet surge requirements, they requested such support because of an immediate need. Generally, following a period of military support the situation may improve or civil authorities are able to increase their capabilities, allowing for the cessation of military support

(8) Search and Rescue. The capability inherent in Army units to provide search and rescue to soldiers in a combat zone is one often required by civil authorities to rescue civilians during disasters such as floods or building collapses. Army units are not designed for the more technical aspects of search and rescue in destroyed buildings such as the World Trade Center. However, they must be capable of providing manpower for debris removal while searching for buried people or operating aircraft and sensors that would assist in retrieving lost or stranded civilians. Military working dogs have been used in the past to assist these efforts and will likely be required in the future.

(9) Security. Historically, the Army has provided security force augmentation to civil authorities during civil disturbances; special events, such as Olympic event disasters, and during times when mission loads far exceed the capacity of civilian law enforcement agencies, such as airport security augmentation. The Army must remain capable of providing these types of capabilities. All soldiers and units must be appropriately trained in security procedures, use of force, and rules of engagement. While homeland zone responsiveness is essential to reacting to threat, we must ensure that proactive intelligence and dissemination efforts are occurring in order to prevent events before they occur. Likewise, if threat intents suggest attacks, integrated security operations and tiered response capabilities must be available either from civilian agencies or the military to ensure the protection of state and national infrastructures, facilities, and critical assets.

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(10) Automated Language Translation. Homeland Operations will require Automated Language Translation including text-to-text, text-to-voice, voice-to-text, and voice-to-voice translations for manned and unmanned systems. This system will enable organizations to rapidly translate and transmit information. Additionally, it will allow commanders to interact with local and regional people, agencies and forces.

(11) Sensors, Sensor Fusion, and Networking. Homeland Operations will require an ISR architecture that ensures unity of purpose for all sensors. Human and technical, manned and unmanned, terrestrial and space-based capabilities will be needed to sense the operational environment and detect, identify and track threats. Advanced sensor capabilities integrated vertically and horizontally from strategic to tactical level and sensor networking will provide holistic situational awareness. These could, for example, link monitoring and control of environmental issues and reaction to an incident. Future sensor design must adapt to the changing threat environment and not necessarily be designed against traditional military systems. Future ISR sensors must be able to effectively collect against the difficult asymmetric problem sets, which may pose the greatest threat to the homeland.

(12) Offensive and Defensive Information Operations. . Homeland Operations will require the Army to both leverage existing and emergent full-spectrum IO capabilities. Commanders will conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) IO to apply the information element of combat power. Combined with information management and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, effective IO results in gaining and maintaining information superiority. Information operations allow commanders to shape the operational environment and enhance the effects of all elements of combat power. IO has two categories, offensive IO and defensive IO. Commanders conduct IO by synchronizing IO elements and related activities, each of which may be used either offensively or defensively. Information operations bring together several previously separate functions as IO elements and related activities. Commanders use IO (core and supporting elements) and related activities (public affairs and civil affairs) to shape the battlespace and the related information environments."

(13) Integrated Air and Missile Defense. In meeting the threat to the homeland, The Army must be able to participate in an integrated, joint force that will detect and destroy enemy cruise and ballistic missile systems. Space and Missile Defense Systems must be thoroughly integrated, both vertically and horizontally, to provide a single, layered missile defense system. Missile defense C2 systems must be able to share time critical, common, unambiguous, and continuous information. When required, Army Air and Missile Defense units will provide point defense of designated high value assets to deter and, if necessary, destroy all enemy air and missile threats.

(14) Counterdrug Operations. When directed to do so, The Army must have access to capabilities to detect and monitor suspected drug traffickers. It must assure that tactics, techniques and procedures for planning and conducting

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counterdrug interdiction and eradication missions in military support to law enforcement remain up-to-date and relevant.

(15) Precision Munitions. These munitions are needed to minimize collateral damage while retaining the ability to destroy the desired target. They will also reduce logistical requirements

(16) Mobile, Responsive, Deployable Units. To assure timely availability of forces, they must be highly mobile, deployable, and ready to fight in locations throughout the world including the homeland.

(17) Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP). As a presentation of timely, fused, accurate, assured, and relevant information, the CROP must be tailored to meet the requirements of forces involved in Homeland Operations.

(18) Unmanned/Riverine/Underground/Aerial Vehicles and Robotics. These must be available to provide surveillance, strike, or interdiction with minimal danger to US forces involved. Robotics will prove essential as an alternative to risking human life during CBRNE reconnaissance and detection, thermobarics and EOD operations.

(19) Enhanced Digital Terrain Enhanced Data System. This type of terrain information will help make Army forces more capable of analyzing terrain in order to conduct operations as well as making terrain data accessible faster and in more detail.

Required Capabilities by Zone

	HZ	FZ
Interagency Coordination, Integration and Communication	P	P
Detection and Mitigation Support	P	
Intelligence and Information Fusion	P	P
Engineering	P	
Logistics Coordination, Distribution, and Medical	P	
Lethal and Non-Lethal Capabilities	P	P
Civil Augmentation Resources	P	
Search and Rescue	P	P
Security	P	
Automated Language Translation	P	P
Sensors, Sensor Fusion, and Networking	P	P
Offensive and Defensive Information Operations	P	P
Integrated Air and Missile Defense	P	P
Counterdrug Operations	P	P
Precision Munitions	P	P
Mobile, Deployable Units	P	P
Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP)	P	P
Unmanned Vehicles	P	P
Enhanced Digital Terrain Enhanced Data System	P	P

HZ- Homeland Zone) FZ- (Forward Zone)

f. **The Objective Force in Homeland Operations**

(1) The Objective Force. The Objective Force (OF) is the force that achieves Army transformation and could be used in Homeland Operations. It is a future force – a common design applied to the entire Army that builds a force, which is responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable as described earlier and in *The Army Vision*. The OF will be able to dominate in any operation and transition quickly to different missions without losing momentum.

(2) Unit of Purpose Framework. The OF employs a Unit of Purpose framework to help The Army examine its organizations, tasks, purposes, C2, and mission tailoring for Homeland Operations. At present, the framework establishes two basic organizations — the Unit of Employment (UE) and the Unit of Action (UA).

(a) Unit of Employment. The OF UE is a versatile, multidimensional organization that can perform numerous roles and functions. It gives the President, Secretary of Defense, and joint force commander (JFC) a broad set of options for use in all phases and across the full spectrum of operations. The UE's organization and design will make it capable of such C2 functions as an ARFOR, functional component command, or JTF. The UE can synchronize operations of federal, state, local and nongovernmental entities. The general-purpose quality of this force ensures its long-term relevance to adaptive, sophisticated threats and the frequently changing requirements of the COE, including disasters. The UE will be able to conduct simultaneous operations synchronized with other forces in a distributed, non-linear homeland environment. The UE can rapidly deploy or augment for immediate response where the Army may be *lead* or *support*. It can become a larger organization through contingency mission tailoring. In the past, UE were field armies, corps and divisions.

(b) Unit of Action. UA are the tactical echelons of the OF. For analytic purposes the UA comprises those echelons brigade and below. Maneuver UAs are the smallest combined arms units that can operate independently. Sub-components of the UA may operate in the homeland for specific, specialized functions where a brigade-sized unit is unnecessary or impractical. For continued developmental purposes, the core of the UA brigade is the combined arms combat battalion that commands a number of organic small tactical units, which may perform homeland operations as teams of teams. The span of control of the UA brigade is four to six battalions. Maneuver UAs will need durability, endurance and stamina. The UA can be augmented by the UE to meet full spectrum requirements. When needed, UA capabilities facilitate operational integration with civilian components of Homeland Operations.

3.3 Force Operating Capabilities (FOCs). The following FOCs are needed to implement this concept. (See TP 525-66 for full descriptions)

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FOC-02-01: Deployability.

FOC-05-01: Mounted / Dismounted Maneuver.

FOC-05-03: Operations in Urban and Complex Terrain.

FOC-10-01: Maneuver Support.

FOC-10-02: Military Engineering.

FOC-03-08: Information Operations.

FOC-03-01: Command and Control

FOC-03-03: Advanced Collection, Processing, Analysis, Management and Sharing of Information.

FOC-03-06: Situational Understanding.

FOC-04-01: Sensor Fusion.

FOC-09-01: Survivability and Force Protection.

FOC-03-07: Decision and Planning Support.

FOC-12-01: Training and Leader Development.

SP 97-021: Space Control. (TP 525-60)

FOC-11-06: Global Casualty Prevention.

Chapter 4

Implications


4-1. Doctrine.

Legacy doctrine exists for many aspects of Homeland Security in various Joint and Army publications. However, they require updates to reflect policy and organizational changes in DOD and the federal government. Doctrine is lacking for the operational headquarters. New and updated doctrine should address RDO, ISR, force protection and combating terrorism, especially on installations and facilities in the homeland and overseas and populace control.

4-2. Organizations.

When new requirements are placed on The Army by civil authorities, or new technological threats emerge, The Army may need to modify certain

organizations. This will affect both AC and RC forces. Generally, the Army will not create structure explicitly to support Homeland Operations. However, existing formations may be tailored, when necessary, to support operations in the homeland. Units should be organized to provide four basic functions: C2, manpower, detection and mitigation of consequences of attacks, disasters, or catastrophes, and logistics. Foreseeable Homeland Operations will include a mix of one or more of these functions in varying proportion.



Formations should have organic lift assets and be completely mobile at the current company and battalion or UA level in the OF. C2 elements must be prepared to incorporate seamless vertical and horizontal civil integration into their structure.

4-3. Training.

Training in Homeland Operations includes many of the collective skills that units already possess. Additional cross training between military and civilian sectors can enhance a seamless response to Homeland Operations. Often, required operations will mirror conventional missions but the unit will operate in the civilian sector. Likewise, individual skills will remain identical. Army training support strategies are essential to providing the training link between traditional tactical operations to support the civilian domain in Homeland Operations. Headquarters staff training should be increased to prepare soldiers and leaders to perform in the unique environment of the homeland. Greatly expanded "Intelligence in Combating Terrorism" training for The Army is necessary. Such training must include the dynamics of terrorist organizations, from how they are configured to how they recruit and finance their organizations. CBRNE training involves inherent differences from a traditional battlefield response (warfare agents) and the Homeland Operations response in both technique and equipment. Additional training from the soldier to the unit level must be added to the Army training process. This will require an expansion of training time and training bases at many Army Training Centers, especially the US Army Chemical School. The Army must also develop counterintelligence and criminal intelligence cross training. All Army organizations require training in terrorism awareness to include potential threat organizations and "cyber" warfare techniques. HAZMAT courses and other courses dealing with the consequences of CBRNE/WME must also be developed and standardized within governmental agencies. The training strategy must take advantage of emerging training technologies and the expanding battlespace information network. It must address improving training delivery,

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increasing knowledge retention and must support legacy, interim, and FCS equipped components of the OF.

4-4. Materiel.

With the rapid advances in technology, materiel development must mature at a similar speed to counter potential threats. While The Army creates new systems, especially in the area of C2, the ability to integrate them into civilian-compatible procedures is a challenge. Special emphasis must occur in the areas of detecting and mitigating the effects of CBRNE and WME and their delivery systems. Additionally, The Army needs to capitalize on COTS and government off the shelf (GOTS) capabilities and streamline current acquisition procedures to ensure the most recent technologies are available in a timely manner. These capabilities may be aligned at the unit, installation or force-level. Categories should include: barriers, security sensors, illumination devices, video, biometrics, sniper detection systems, vehicle immobilization devices/systems, bomb detection systems, blast mitigation systems, robotics, personnel emergency notification systems, personnel protective equipment, entry control systems, and communications devices, and non-lethal capabilities. The C2 architecture must have robust communications with connectivity to city, county, state, and federal law enforcement organizations. This includes sensitive compartmented information facilities at major installations and major commands (MACOMs). The Army must evaluate installations with large perimeters in complex and urban terrain to determine if a requirement for unattended sensors exists. The intelligence personnel at MACOM and installation level require automation hardware and software to facilitate the transfer of information and intelligence.

4-5. Leadership and Education.

Leaders will require traditional leadership skills in conducting support to Homeland Operations. However, with these activities taking place in a joint, interagency, and multijurisdictional context, more emphasis is required to develop the special skills, knowledge, and abilities needed by leaders in such operations.

Leaders require additional training and rehearsal in the development of commander critical information requirements and essential elements of friendly information that structure and focus the ISR collection and analysis effort. Members of all organizations conducting Homeland Operations must not only fully understand their roles and responsibilities, but also how those responsibilities relate to those of partner organizations in the civil sector. They must be prepared to serve under the operational control or in support of other components of the Army. Leaders must ensure that every soldier, dependent and civilian recognizes and reports unusual activities and operational anomalies, which enable ISR analysts to develop predictive intelligence products.

The hallmark of leadership development includes core competencies of leadership skills, computer proficiency, branch and battlefield operating system technical skills, battle staff skills, joint, and interagency skills. Taken as a sum,

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these competencies result in leaders who are well prepared to function in SSCs, MCOs, stability, and Homeland Operations.

These competencies must complement the values, attributes, and actions that are taught, learned and practiced. Leaders must be situationally aware, multi-skilled/multifunctional, and capable of operating in environments of high stress and frequent ambiguity brought on by a chaotic, non-linear battle space or major disaster, or incident involving massive damage or mass casualties within the homeland.

4-6. Personnel.

Quality soldiers trained and led by competent and caring leaders and supported by government civilians and contractors remain key to success in Homeland Operations. Soldiers will face a myriad of challenges, some of which will cause unusual stress as they operate in their homeland amidst possible destruction and mass casualties. The requirement to maintain law and order, sometimes while using deadly force, will cause tension between soldiers and civilians and may cause additional stress on soldiers. Motivation to accomplish the Homeland Operations mission will be high, but the emotional impact of operating in a disastrous situation within the homeland will be great.

4-7 Facilities.

Certain Army installations may serve as force projection platforms that facilitate the ability of The Army to protect, prevent, and respond in Homeland Operations. To maintain and enhance this capability, The Army will need to construct state-of-the art facilities for training soldiers and others in Homeland Operations. It must also design, construct, or upgrade facilities for better protection against attacks or hazards and coordinate with local communities for mutual support and assistance when attacks or other hazards take place in the homeland.

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Appendix A

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1507 **Glossary**

1508 **Section 1. Abbreviations**

1509	AC	Active Component
1510	AR	Army Regulation
1511	ARFOR	Army forces
1512	ARNG	Army National Guard
1513	C2	Command and Control
1514	C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computer,
1515		Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
1516	CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield
1517		Explosives
1518	COTS	Commercial Off The Shelf
1519	CROP	Common Relevant Operational Picture
1520	CTC	Combat Training Center
1521	CS	Combat Support; Civil Support
1522	DOD	Department of Defense
1523	DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leader
1524		Development, Personnel, and Facilities
1525	FCS	Future Combat System
1526	FM	Field Manual
1527	FRP	Federal Response Plan
1528	GBMCDS	Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense System
1529	HLS	Homeland Security
1530	HO	Homeland Operations
1531	IO	Information Operations
1532	IS	Information Superiority
1533	ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
1534	JTF	Joint Task Force
1535	LFA	Lead Federal Agency
1536	LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
1537	MACOM	Major Command
1538	MCO	Major Combat Operation
1539	OF	Objective Force

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1540	NSSE	National Security Special Events
1541	O&O	Operational and Organizational
1542	RC	Reserve Component
1543	RDO	Rapid Decisive Operations
1544	RISTA	Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target
1545		Acquisition
1546	SSC	Smaller-scale contingencies
1547	SOF	Special Operations Forces
1548	UA	Unit of Action
1549	UE	Unit of Employment
1550	WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
1551	WME	Weapons of Mass Effects

1552

1553

1554 Section 2. Terms

1555

1556 **Civil Support.** Department of Defense support to US civil authorities for
1557 domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities.
1558 Also called CS (JCS working definition).

1559

1560 **Domestic Terrorism.** Involves groups or individuals whose activities are directed
1561 at elements of our government or population without foreign direction.

1562 **Functional component command.** A command normally, but not necessarily
1563 composed of forces of two or more Military Departments, which may be
1564 established across the range of military operations to perform particular
1565 operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of
1566 time. (JP 1-02).

1567 **Force Protection.** Force protection consists of those actions to prevent or
1568 mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members),
1569 resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's
1570 fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place. It
1571 coordinates and synchronizes offensive and defensive measures to enable the
1572 joint force to perform while reducing opportunities for the enemy. Force
1573 protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against
1574 accidents, weather, or disease. (FM 3-0).

1575 **Homeland Defense.** The protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic
1576 population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression.
1577 Also called HLD (JCS working definition).

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Homeland Operations. Homeland Operations consist of those measures to prevent, protect, and/or respond to all-hazard threats against the United States, its territories and possessions, that endanger its people, resources, facilities, and critical infrastructure. It coordinates and synchronizes active and passive measures between federal (to include DOD), state, and local governments/agencies to protect the United States.

Homeland Security. The preparation for, prevention of, deterrence of, preemption of, defense against, and response to threats and aggression directed towards U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure; as well as crisis management, consequence management, and other domestic civil support. Also called HLS (JCS working definition).

International terrorism. Activities undertaken by or in support of terrorists or terrorist organizations that occur totally outside the United States, or that transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek asylum. (DODD 5240.1-R).

Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA). Those DOD activities and measures covered under MSCA (natural and man-made disasters) plus DOD assistance for civil disturbances, counterdrug, sensitive support, counterterrorism, and law enforcement. (DODD 3025.15).

Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). Those activities and measures taken by DOD components to foster mutual assistance and support between DOD and any civil government agency in planning or preparing for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies. (DODD 3025.10).

Terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02).

Weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02).

Weapons of mass effects. Chemical, nuclear, radiological, and biological weapons or electronic programs or devices or large conventional explosives that create significant or catastrophic effects on life, commerce, property or information and information systems, though they do not ensure destruction. Also called WME.